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It is widely acknowledged among those philosophers and theologians who have given 
the matter much thought that the fact of animal suffering challenges Theism in a 
distinctive way. Standard attempts to reconcile human suffering with a perfectly powerful 
and benevolent deity don’t seem to apply easily to the case of animals. Animals can 
hardly be said to deserve their suffering or be morally improved by it, nor is it generally 
supposed that animals will be compensated for their pain in an afterlife. On the face of it, 
then, animal pain appears to be a bothersome evil still left over when all the theodicy 
work is done. I would like to consider some of the attempts to deal with animal suffering 
in theodicy, showing why each ultimately fails. Rather than attempting to provide the 
successful theodicy myself, I will try to show what the theodicies reveal about the 
relationship between Theism and moral attitudes toward animals.  
 
I. The “Corrupted Creation” Thesis: 
 
One way to try to avoid the problem altogether is to connect the problem of animal 
suffering with that of natural evil generally in the following way. Suppose there are 
angelic beings with free will who rebel against God and as a result of their fall, corrupt 
the natural order in such a way as to cause animal pain. C. S. Lewis1 and many others 
endorse this view, contending that the evil of predation is a direct result of this angelic 
fall. The idea that nature was thus perverted in this way goes back at least to John Calvin2 
and has been supported more recently by Alvin Plantinga.3 The virtue of this approach is 
that both animal and human suffering can be held to be the result of the abuse of freedom 
of the will—whether by angels or people. 
 
I don’t want to discuss the Corrupted Creation thesis at length because its weaknesses 
seem apparent enough. Many of those who embrace the thesis situate it in a context of a 
larger theodicy. The thesis is rejected by some for largely theological reasons, but there 
are other very basic reasons to be suspicious. First, evolution provides a very strong 
explanation for the existence of predation. There just is no evidence for a different, kinder 
and gentler natural order that preceded the one we have. Second, an omnipotent deity 
presumably could have prevented animal suffering even if the natural order were 
corrupted. The creator could hardly escape responsibility for animal suffering because it 
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was caused by other creatures under the creator’s power. Third, from the standpoint of 
the arguer from evil, the problem of animal pain is a fact that counts against the existence 
of God. It would be odd indeed to defend the thesis that God exists by appealing to angels 
or other creatures whose existence is intrinsically even more doubtful. Fourth, and this is 
somewhat ad hominem, while not all Theists endorse the design argument for the 
existence of God, most want to say that God is nevertheless revealed in nature: as the 
Psalmist said, “The heavens declare the glory of God. The firmament sheweth his 
handiwork.”4 It’s just hard to see how nature can provide evidence both for the existence 
of God while blaming fallen angels for all that went wrong. Fifth, it is unfair for innocent 
creatures to suffer for the crimes of others. An angelic fall could hardly reconcile the fact 
of animal suffering with a perfectly powerful and just God. 
 
The Corrupted Creation thesis, then, appears to be a false trail. There is no positive 
reason to accept it. Nevertheless, this approach does something that most of the other 
theodicies don’t: it recognizes animal pain as a very serious evil. A Theist might well 
take the human moral relationship to animals seriously and offer this theodicy to explain 
God’s tolerance of animal suffering. While the Corrupted Creation thesis falls short of 
such an explanation, our animal-loving Theist does at least have a consistent position. 
But the price of consistency is implausibility. 
 
II. The “Animals Are Non-Conscious” Thesis 
 
Suppose we had good reasons for thinking that animals do not actually feel pain, that 
their pain behavior is not supported by genuine unpleasant conscious mental states. 
Clearly, if pain is non-conscious, it would not be an intrinsic evil, and thus the argument 
from animal pain loses most of its force. At most, one might argue that apparent animal 
pain provides some evidence against theism but perhaps not much. The deeply troubling 
features of animal pain disappear if it can be shown that their “pain” is actually non-
conscious. However, the evidence in favor of genuinely conscious animal pain appears to 
be strong indeed. Nevertheless, Peter Harrison argues that we do have good reason to 
think that animals do not feel pain.5
 
That animals are conscious of their pain states might appear to be overwhelmingly 
obvious, but Harrison insists this evidence is inconclusive. For example, animal behavior 
provides grounds for believing that animals genuinely feel their pains, since many 
animals behave much in the same way as humans do when we are in pain. However, 
while the analogy between humans and animals seems persuasive, Harrison cites 
evidence pointing to a quite different conclusion. Pain-behavior by itself does not 
decisively demonstrate that animals have conscious pain states; after all, a non-conscious 
robot could be designed that simulated pain-behavior when damaged, as Harrison 
correctly points out. In addition, animals commonly fake injury and often do not exhibit 
pain-behavior when they are injured. In the first sort of case, presumably all agree that 
there is no genuine conscious pain state that leads to the relevant behavior—the pain 
behavior is, after all, faked. In the second type of case, the principal indicator of a 
conscious pain-state (i.e., the pain-behavior) is absent. This point, of course, is that 
behavior is no reliable guide to the actual mental state in question.  
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Pain-behavior may not imply conscious pain, but another reason to think that animals 
actually feel their pain is the similarity between human and infrahuman neurological 
structure. In this case, Harrison questions the inference from the physical to the mental. It 
does not logically follow that a certain physical state must give rise to a certain mental 
state. While the connection between many mental and brain states seems fairly well 
established, there are, as Harrison is quick to point out, many exceptions. He cites the 
case of a human who was able to see even though he had no visual cortex. Similarly, 
some birds are capable of vision without the help of a visual cortex. Thus, the subjective 
state seems to occur without its supposed neurological cause. Harrison also invokes 
Nagel’s, “What’s It Like To Be a Bat?”6 to support his contention that knowledge of 
animal neurological structure does not provide knowledge of animal experience. But it is 
the animal experience of pain that is supposed to count against the existence of an 
omnipotent, benevolent deity.  
 
So far Harrison has argued that neither behavior nor neurological structure is sufficient 
evidence for animal consciousness of pain, but what about evolutionary evidence? Pain 
tends to reinforce behavior that promotes survival and well-being and discourage 
behavior that does not for both humans and animals. However, Harrison contends that 
this functional role can be satisfied without the phenomenal quality of pain. All that is 
required is pain-behavior in the presence of noxious stimuli. We simply have no reason to 
assume on the basis of evolution that animal experience of pain is anything like that of 
humans. Indeed, Harrison urges we have reason to think that animals do not and cannot 
experience pain in this way. 
 
While the functional purposes of pain-behavior do not require that a subject actually feel 
the pain, rational behavior can and does make use of the experience of pain. For a rational 
agent, the experience of pain can count as a reason for or against certain courses of 
action. Harrison contends that animals cannot be agents in this sense, so there is no 
question of them experiencing pain. The experience of pain for them would be 
superfluous. Furthermore, humans’ higher cognitive capacity enables them to have a 
continuity of experience through which they can “own” their pain. Animals lack this 
ability, so animals lack the awareness of pain. 
 
If Harrison’s arguments had succeeded, the need to work out a theodicy for animal pain 
would all but disappear. True animal pain would not exist, and hence could not count 
against the power or goodness of God. But his argument is not successful. His strategy 
was to take up the considerations in favor of animal pain one by one and show that none 
implies that animals really feel their pains. Then he tries to offer an account of pain 
consciousness that would preclude the possibility of conscious animal pain. While none 
of the arguments he considers individually establishes that animals experience pain, 
Harrison overlooks the fact that cumulatively they provide very strong support for that 
thesis. Behavioral and neurological evidence together with arguments from evolution are 
persuasive indeed. And normally in human cases, we do not require more. 
 
The best evidence that any human other than oneself can experience pain is the same sort 
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of behavioral and neurological evidence that we have for animals. And the evidence 
provides as much support for animal pain as it does for human pain. Of course, humans 
can engage in linguistic behavior as well, providing further evidence of being in pain. 
You can say, but your dog cannot, “I am in pain.” But linguistic behavior is just more 
behavior, and the sorts of Cartesian doubts that applied to less sophisticated forms of 
pain-behavior apply here as well. Normally we don’t take such doubts seriously in the 
human case, and, contrary to Harrison’s contention, there appears to be little reason to 
take them seriously in the case of animals. Indeed, a linguistic report of one’s pain is, at 
Wittgenstein observed, a special learned pain-behavior. And this learned pain-behavior is 
unintelligible apart from the nonlearned varieties. Both sorts of behavior seem to provide 
expression to a normally conscious state. 
 
Harrison wants to deny that animal learning requires conscious pain. But at least some 
forms of learning are inexplicable except on the assumption that the organism feels pain. 
While it’s pain-behavior, not pain itself, that’s adaptive, it’s hard to understand how the 
adaptive pain-behavior can be reinforced, unless an organism can experience pain. 
Harrison attempts to make sense of such learning by describing it as acquired adaptive 
pain-behavior in the presence of noxious stimuli. But how is the adaptive pain-behavior 
acquired? Harrison allows that the answer must be through sensation, but the sensation of 
noxious stimuli is a part of what we mean by a conscious pain state.  
 
Since many animals can learn from the experience of pain, it is evident, contrary to 
Harrison’s assertions, that these animals have sufficient continuity of experience. While 
pain is a sensory experience, it does, to be sure, have a cognitive element, although it 
clearly need not involve so much cognitive complexity as to exclude the possibility of an 
animal pain.  
 
Perhaps the existence of animal pain can in the end be reconciled with a good and 
powerful deity. But it is hard to see that such a reconciliation can be achieved based on 
the denial of animal pain. The denial would render theodicy superfluous, and while it 
remains logically possible that animals (as well as other humans) are not conscious of 
their pains, it is hardly plausible. Animal pain remains a brute fact, and the challenge to 
theism remains open. 
 
III. The “Animal Pain Isn’t As Bad As It Seems” Thesis 
 
While the outright denial of the existence of animal pain does not seem to be a 
promising path for theodicy, perhaps there are considerations about the nature of that pain 
that might soften its impact against the truth of theism. This seems to be the view of John 
Hick.7 Actually Hick advances three related theses concerning the issue of animal pain. 
The first idea is that pain and pleasure are relative; the second distinguishes pain from 
suffering, and the third offers that the purpose of animal existence is to be understood in 
terms of God’s salvic design.  
 
I want to start with the second idea. Hick contends that while there is ample evidence that 
pain is widespread in nature, suffering is a distinct and distinctively human experience. 
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Suffering, on this view, appears to involve a more complex cognitive awareness than 
Hick believes is reasonably attributable to animals. Pain may be intrinsically evil, though 
Hick is quick to emphasize its instrumental value, but it is a relatively simple mental state 
when compared to suffering. To suffer, one must have certain mental attitudes. One must 
have beliefs and desires and be able to conceptualize one’s experience, etc. Pain states 
presumably do not require anything so sophisticated; pain is a kind of immediate sensory 
awareness. In this way suffering is a second-order experience. You may be in pain, but 
the attitudes you have about your pain can transform simple pain into suffering. Also, a 
being could suffer even when physical pain is absent. Accordingly, a being who is 
capable of pain experiences, but incapable of suffering, is presumably better off than a 
being that can experience pain and suffer. 
 
Insofar as suffering and pain are to be distinguished, then, much suffering might be 
regarded as involving higher-order intentional states about one’s pains: one not only has 
the pain but is also distressed because of the pain.8 In addition, suffering may also be 
directed toward one’s general condition even if pain is absent: the loss of a loved one 
may not cause any straightforward physical discomfort. In these sorts of cases, suffering 
appears to involve higher-order attitudes about matters other than one’s own pain. Hick 
maintains that suffering seems to require a fairly sophisticated cognitive capacity of the 
sort only humans can possess.  
 
According to Hick, then, suffering is the greater evil, and animals do not suffer because 
of their relative cognitive poverty. And, while it is intrinsically evil, animal pain is 
instrumentally good, since it contributes to the survival of the organism by warning of 
various dangers, etc. Without the capacity to feel pain, animals would not really be 
animals at all. Thus, Hick follows Augustine in claiming that to ask why God permits 
animal pain is equivalent to asking why God creates animals in the first place. Hick’s 
answer is to relate it to God’s salvic purposes regarding humanity. In this context, Hick 
speaks of animals as serving the human apex by being a part of the background in which 
God is kept at epistemic distance from humanity.9
 
I have noted that Hick’s animal theodicy seems to have several elements. First, there is 
the claim that suffering provides the greater challenge to theism, and since animals don’t 
suffer, they cannot be said to be a part of that challenge. Second is the contention that 
pain is a necessary feature of animal existence because of its instrumental value for 
animal life. And third, there is the assertion that animal existence is best understood in 
terms of God’s purposes for humanity. The latter two features might well be 
challenged,10 but they play their roles in Hick’s overall argument only if he succeeds in 
establishing that animals do not genuinely suffer and that suffering is worse than mere 
pain. Hick is not successful in this endeavor.  
 
There is the important question of evidence. What sort of evidence should count against 
or in favor of a creature’s being capable of suffering or other more complex 
psychological states? Precisely how much cognitive complexity is required for being a 
candidate for suffering? Hick’s answers are suggestive at best; indeed, as far as I can tell, 
he offers no real evidence beyond the mere assertion that animals lack such a capacity. I 
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won’t pursue these issues now; instead, let’s focus on his contention that the possession 
of higher order mental states makes a bad situation worse. 
 
The central idea is that higher cognitive capacity may increase the negative quality of 
some experiences. However, such higher-order thinking about one’s unpleasant states can 
also potentially reduce the negative aspects of pain. If, for instance, an individual is 
cognizant of the fact that a painful medical treatment is necessary and the pain temporary, 
the negative quality of the experience is likely to be reduced. But such reasons offer no 
comfort to creatures incapable of understanding them, as anyone who has tried to comfort 
an injured pet knows.  
 
Higher cognitive powers may have other benefits with respect to pain as well. Daniel 
Dennett observes that various meditative techniques of pain-reduction seem to be 
available only to humans.11 The success of these practices for treating human pain does 
not consist in providing reasons for the pain but in the fact that these “pain reducing” 
techniques are available only for individuals with a fairly complex cognitive 
organization.12  
 
Rationalizing pain and sophisticated pain-reducing techniques thus mitigate the 
unpleasant experiences of adult human beings but apparently not animals. If they only 
could conceptualize their pains, the experience might not be so bad. Indeed, it seems that 
the best way to describe the situation with animals is to say that they do sometimes suffer 
mental anguish on account of their pain because of fear and other intentional states, but 
their inability to be aware fully of the situation prevents them from reducing either their 
suffering or their pain. 
 
Even if Hick is right about the complexity of mentality required for suffering, he has not 
shown that such complexity necessarily yields a worse hedonic result. Sometimes 
complex intentionality makes matters better and sometimes worse. There can be little 
doubt that some states of suffering are cognitive and intentional: it is about one’s pain or 
one’s general condition, etc. But it is far from clear that a creature’s cognitive capacities 
must be as complex as those typical of humans in order to have the genuine ability to 
suffer. First of all, not all suffering need involve cognitive prowess at all. It makes perfect 
sense to say that one has euthanized an animal so as to end its suffering, even if the 
animal in question was incapable of having intentional states about its condition in any 
way. I suppose that the point of torturing animals, for those who engage in such activities, 
is precisely to bring about suffering in the tortured creature. But the unfortunate beast 
need not have second-order states in order to suffer in this way. It’s an odd stipulation to 
restrict suffering to beings with more sophisticated cognitive powers.  
 
Suppose it is allowed that at least some suffering must involve more cognitive 
complexity, thus modifying Hick’s claim a bit. Still, suffering, in this sense, need not be 
too cognitively sophisticated in order to play the sort of role that Hick has in mind. That 
is to say, while a sense of future and past can play a role—both negatively and 
positively—in some suffering, such suffering remains a possibility for creatures who can 
have beliefs or desires. There are gradations of pain and suffering (as well as more 
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desirable states), and cognitive development seems to be a factor in the kinds of aversive 
states one can experience. Nevertheless, the possibility of animal suffering, even in 
Hick’s oddly restricted sense, remains open as long as it is plausible to hold that animals 
have, in addition to sentience, at least some of the intentional states that play a role in 
suffering. It seems plausible that animals have at least some such states, and I see nothing 
in Hick that demonstrates that they do not. And as long as many animals suffer without 
hope of enjoying unlimited good in the afterlife, their suffering counts rather severely 
against either the goodness or power of God. 
 
Inasmuch as Hick’s theodicy relies upon the distinction between pain and suffering, it 
does not adequately reconcile the fact of animal pain and suffering with a benevolent, 
omnipotent deity. Even if animals only experienced pain and not suffering, the fact of 
animal pain itself is evidence against theism. But they seem not only to feel but also to 
suffer, even though the kind of suffering animals endure differs from typical human 
varieties of suffering. The negative character of animal experience is reduced, but not 
sufficiently to block the argument from the evil of animal pain. 
 
IV. The “God Just Doesn’t Care” Thesis 
 
Is it possible to maintain animal pain and suffering as genuinely evil while holding 
that a perfectly good God simply is not particularly concerned with the plight of animals? 
This is the surprising conclusion of Peter Geach.13 Geach begins making his case along 
teleological lines. If we can infer the existence of God from the majesty of the natural 
world, we should also observe that the evidence does not indicate a divine attempt to 
minimize animal pain. Indeed, a cursory examination of events in the natural world 
appears to confirm the thesis that God cares little about animal suffering. Geach explicitly 
rejects the Corrupted Creation thesis, and yet he is willing to defend the compatibility of 
the absolute goodness of God with God’s apparent lack of concern for animal suffering.  
 
God, Geach observes, is a noncorporeal being and as such does not have a physical 
nature. God cannot be either chaste or brave, because as an omnipotent spirit being he 
cannot be sexually tempted or endangered in any way. But the fact that God cannot be 
called chaste or brave does not imply that he can be labeled unchaste or cowardly. 
Similarly, sympathy on matters involving physical pain can hardly be said to be a virtue 
properly attributed to God. The fact that God does not care about animal suffering, 
therefore, takes nothing away from God’s goodness or power. However, humans do have 
a physical nature, just as animals do. So, we can and do have sympathies toward animals, 
and this is the basis for our obligations to them. These considerations, however, simply 
cannot apply to God, according to Geach. 
 
There are two distinct claims in Geach’s argument. One is that moral action—at least that 
moral action directed toward animals—must be grounded in sympathy. The other claim is 
that it’s not possible for God to have the requisite sympathy. Against the latter claim, one 
might object that sympathy doesn’t require that God actually be a physical being, since 
God is omniscient. God’s omniscience is a sufficient and suitable basis for sympathy 
toward animals. Surely an all-knowing God is aware that both humans and animals 
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suffer. Why isn’t that enough for divine sympathy? Geach might well reply that even the 
property of omniscience has its limits. To be all-knowing, God must be able to know 
everything that, logically, God can know. But God is not a physical being, so there must 
be features of physical existence that are not knowable by God.14  
 
It would seem that God is in a situation somewhat similar to Mary, the fictional color 
scientist of Frank Jackson.15 Mary knows everything there is to know about color but, 
confined to a black and white room, has never had the experience of color herself. The 
controversy over Mary is over whether or not there is some knowledge she lacks. 
Similarly, one might wonder whether Geach’s God can be truly omniscient, being so 
limited by his non-corporeal nature. I hope it is clear that, at least for Geach, it does not 
matter how this question is answered. Either God lacks some special experience-based 
knowledge or not. If what God lacks is not knowledge, then God’s omniscience is not 
impugned. If what God lacks is knowledge, it is not the sort of knowledge that, logically, 
God can have. So, once again, God’s omniscience is not impugned. And since sympathy 
seems plainly to require that a being identify with the plight of another, God cannot have 
sympathy toward the physical plight of nonhuman animals. 
 
Suppose Geach’s claim about divine sympathy is granted. Perhaps there is knowledge 
that can only be had by beings with a physical nature. Perhaps it is permissible to 
describe a being as omniscient even if the being lacks this sort of knowledge. And 
perhaps such a being is incapable of genuine sympathy for another being’s physical 
suffering. Even so, sympathy is not required as a source for moral action even in many 
ordinary human cases. Indeed, it would be rare to excuse a sadist of cruelty to another on 
the grounds that it just wasn’t possible for the sadist to feel sympathy for his or her 
victims. The sadist should know better. Thus, the first of the claims in Geach’s 
argument—sympathy is required for a moral relationship with animals—is dubious. 
While an omnipotent spirit being may be incapable of having the experiences upon which 
some types of knowledge are based, God can still know that physical beings suffer. And a 
perfectly good being should care about physical pain and suffering very much, even 
though God cannot, perhaps, know what it is like to feel pain.  
 
Imagine extraterrestrials with an entirely different make up than ours were to visit us. 
They may have little or no sympathy for our experience of pain if there is nothing 
analogous in their constitution. But, if they could be made to understand that the 
experience of pain is regarded as intrinsically bad by us, they would surely have a reason 
to refrain from causing us pain. If they refused, we would be justified in calling them 
cruel, not because they lacked a natural sympathy but rather because they refused to take 
the pain of others as a reason not to hurt them. Sympathy is helpful in motivating moral 
action, but not necessary even for finite creatures—still less for God. So, if God is 
capable of eliminating animal suffering, even while being incapable of sympathy with it, 
and yet does nothing, God cannot be perfectly good after all, in spite of Geach’s claims to 
the contrary.  
  
V. Theodicy, Ethics, and Animals 
 
Between the Species II August 2002 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 9
The point of my exploration into theism and animal pain has not been to mount an 
argument against the truth of theism. The fact of animal pain, as far as I can tell, cannot 
be proven to be logically inconsistent with the existence of a perfectly benevolent and 
powerful God. The existence of any natural evil, including animal pain, is evidence 
against theism, but it is doubtful that the evidence is decisive by itself. Still, the fact of 
animal suffering seems to cry out for explanation and reconciliation with God’s goodness 
and power. But, in the theodicies examined here, animal pain and suffering were either 
denied or trivialized, and when finally firmly recognized, God’s benevolence was called 
into serious question. 
 
When one embraces theism, one typically embraces much more than adherence to a 
theological belief-system. For most theists, moral life is but a part of one’s religious life. 
But while sympathies of many theists may lead them to moral concern for animals, the 
examination of theodicy and animal pain shows that animals do not fit neatly into the 
theistic moral world view. Conversely, the moral view that takes animals very seriously 
seems to be at odds with the morality of theism. It may be very hard to show that the fact 
of animal pain is incompatible with theism, but the theist who takes animal suffering 
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